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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 7812

DELBERT WATERS,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Delbert Waters, defendant and appellant herein, was
tried before the court without a jury, and convicted of the
crime of assault with intent to commit rape.
The assault upon which the State relies for conviction
was committed some time between the hours of 2:00 o'clock
and 3:00 o'clock A.M. on the morning of August 1, 1951.
Defendant made three unauthorized intrusions into the home

3
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of prosecutrix. The first of these was momentary, an entry
and immediate departure, and was made in the company of one
Gary Dickinson. The second intrusion was also made in the company of Dickinson, and lasted about an hour. The third and last
intrusion defendant made alone, leaving Dickinson out in the
car (Tr. 6, 7, 10, 11, 28, 29). Both defendant and Dickinson
had been drinking (Tr. 31, 32).
The prosecutrix; at the time of the offense was fifteen years
of age. She was alone in the house, her parents having gone
to Yellowstone Park (Tr. 3, 5).
On the second intrusion defendant made improper advances toward prosecutrix (Tr. 7, 8), which were resisted by
her. The third time defendant entered the house he did so
by the back door, proceeded to the bedroom where prosecutrix
was in bed, asleep, got into bed with her, threw his arms around
her, felt her with his hands, and tried to force his penis between
her legs. This sexual assault was resisted by prosecutrix to
the best of her ability (Tr. 9, 10, 11). Defendant, after
struggling with prosecutrix for some time, went to sleep.
Prosecutrix was then able to extricate herself from his grasp,
whereupon she got out of bed and ran a "block and a half
or two blocks" to her aunt's home (Tr. 11, 12).
The uncle of prosecutrix notified the town Constable, who
in turn, notified the sheriff (Tr. 36). When the Sheriff arrived defendant was either asleep, or pretended to be asleep
(Tr. 20), his pants were still open and his privates exposed
(Tr. 13). Defendant was arresetd, he was convicted, and
he now appeals.
4
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
FINDING OF THE COURT.

POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT.

POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
FINDING OF THE COURT.
Point I of appellant's brief challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the finding of the court, that defendant is guilty of the crime of assault with intent to commit
rape. It is respectfully submitted that the record includes
ample evidence of the assault coupled with overt acts and
circumstances which unquestionably indicate an intent and an
attempt on the part of defendant to have intercourse with
prosecutrix. Further, the uncontradicted testimony shows that
the attempt was accompanied by force which was resisted by
prosecutrix (Tr. 10, 11).
During the second visit defendant made advances to
prosecutrix by "patting" her on the head and calling her
"Blondie," at which time prosecurtix slapped his hand hard
"and shoved him away (Tr. 7). Defendant again patted her,
5
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chased her into her bedroom, threw his arms about her pushing
her over on to the bed (Tr. 8). At this point prosecutrix called
out and defendant was induced by his friend Dickinson to
leave the house.
Prosecutrix was next aware of defendant's presence approximately an hour and one-hal.f later when she was awakened by his assault upon her which started while she was asleep
in her bed. Her testimony reveals the following:

* * * and when

I woke, Delbert was in bed with me.

Q. Could you tell how much later it was?
A. Oh, I don't know what time it was then.

Q. You went to sleep and the next you recall was
when you woke up?
A. When I woke up.

Q. All right. You may continue.
A. And he had both his arms around me and he was
rubbing his face over my back and I didn't know
what to think.

Q. How did you know it was Delbert?
A. Well, I didn't know, but I just had the feeling it
was, until I came back with Kathleen and Dee.
I wasn't sure who it was. I really didn't know who
it was.

Q. Did he say anything?.
A. No, and he had both his arms around me and held
me tight around the waist and I tried to move his
hands and he wouldn't move them and he tried
to put hands up here (indicating)6
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Q. When you say here, do you mean your chest or
neck?
A. Up here, my neck (indicating). I took hold of his
hands and put them back down and he started
putting his hand down this way and I pushed them
away (indicating).
.
Q. You mean on your lower body?
A. Yes.
Q. When you say "here" the record wouldn't say and
I have to inquire what part of your body or your
anatomy, and if you mention that part of the body,
then we get it into the record, you see what I mean?
A. Yes.

Q. All right, you may continue.
A. And at first I couldn't stop him. He just, well, he
was just all hands. I couldn't take hold of his hands
and he tried to take my under clothes off and I
don't know, but anyway his thing was out and he
was trying to put it between my legs and I wouldn't
let him and I dido' t know what to think and I took
hold of his hands and I held them just as tight as
I could and he had hold of my waist so hard I
couldn't move.
Q. When you say his "thing," for the record do you
mean penis?
A. Yes, and I couldn't even move and I tried to move
over once and he wouldn't let go of me and I
raised up on my elbow and I sat there, laying on
my elbow and I had to wait quite a while and then
not too long he went so [to] sleep real fast, it
seemed to me anyway, and I took hold of his hands,
anyway I took hold of his one hand and moved
it over and he didn't make any move to move it
7
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back and I decided he must be asleep and I took
the covers and moved them back and I got out of
bed as quiet as I could and I jumped 1,1p and ran,
and ran just as fast as I could for the bathroom,
* * * I locked the door, * * *I turned on
the light and from the way things was I guess he
was wandering around the house, because there
was a beer can on top of the toilet * * * (Tr. 9,
10, 11).

Quietly going into another bedrom prosecutrix put on a housecoat and ran "as fast as I could" to the home of her aunt and
uncle's (Tr. 12).
On cross examination, prosecutrix testified as follows:
Q. You testified he attempted to remove your panties?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he attempt to tear them from your body or
did he attempt to slide them down your legs?
* * * *
A. He just took hold of them and started pulling and
then he put his hands underneath them (Tr. 17).
Clearly, evidence of this character affords the trier of
the facts ample ground upon which to find defendant guilty.
Appellant admits the evidence shows prosecutrix had
not the strength to overpower defendant and that defendant
was a "young man of considerable strength" (Page 23, App.
Br.) Under these circumstances appellant contends however,
that the evidence does not make out the requisite intent to have
carnal knowledge of prosecutrix, because he did not in fact
rape her, and because he voluntarily desisted by going to
sleep (Page 31, App. Br.)
8
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In the case of State v. Andreason, 44 Idaho 396, 257 P.
370, 371, similar facts were considered sufficient to sustain a
conviction of assault with intent to commit rape. The court
stated:
The gravamen of the offense charged against appellant is the specific intent with which the assault,
admittedly proved, was alleged to have been made;
that is, that appellant attacked the person of the prosecuting witness with the aim, design, and purpose of having carnal knowledge of her. The question of intent
is one of fact to be determined by the jury. (Citing
cases).

* * * *
If it be conceded that appellant finally desisted in
his efforts to accomplish the object which the jury
found he had intended, and that it was by reason of
his cessation from the encounter that he did not consummate his purpose, this would not justify the conclusion of an absence of a lecherous desire before he
withdrew from the struggle, or detract in any way
from the effect of his exhibition. (Emphasis supplied).
In People v. Lutes, 97 Cal. App. 2d 233, 179 P2d 815,
817, a case tried before the court without a jury, the court in
sustaining a conviction of assault with intent to commit rape,
stated the law to be as follows:

* * * It is asserted on behalf of appellant that he
had no intention of committing rape, and it is argued
in his behalf that the fact that he had the. physical
power, ability and opportunity to have c.ommitted ~he
act and voluntarily gave up the quest wtthout outstde
interference or fear of interruption is evidence that
he had no such intention. The fact that appellant desisted is immaterial. The crime is complete if at any
9
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moment during the assault the defendant intends to
have carnal knowledge of the victim and to use for
that purpose whatever force may be required. (Citing cases).
Whether or not such intention existed must be determined from all the circumstances and the acts of
the defendant, and is a question for the trial court.
To the same effect see People v. Norrington, 55 Cal. App. 103,
202 P. 932; Ross v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. Rep. 547, 1:.2 S. W.
793; State v. Moore, 110 Kan. 732, 205 P. 644.
The undisputed evidence establishes that defendant committed the assault on prosecutrix at night, in a private home,
away from fear of apprehension; that he exposed his penis and
attempted penetration; that he was alone and that he knew
prosecutrix to be alone; that prosecutrix was frightened and
resisted him the best she could. Facts of this nature have all
been considered sufficient to warrant an inference of intent,
drawn by the jury and the trial court. People v. Norrington,
supra; People v. Onessimo, 65 Cal. App. 341, 224 P. 101;
People v. Moore, 155 Cal. 237, 100 P~ 688. See also, People
v. Jones, 112 Cal. App. 68,296 P. 317,319, where the court
stated that advanced preparation to commit the crime of assault
with intent to commit rape was shown by the fact that the assailant apparently had every opportunity to know prosecutrix to
be in her house alone.

POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
10
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Appellant asserts in Point II that neither the informatiot;1
nor the conduct of the trial by the prosecution apprised defendant of the offense for which he was convicetd. In other
'vords, appellant seems to say the State proved two disfailed to indicate the one of which he was found guilty. Appellant made no demand at the trial that the prosecution. make
any election.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence adduced
by the State shows only one offense of assault with intent to
commit rape. Further, that the evidence showing the advances
made to, and the improper liberties taken with the person of
prosecutrix on the occasion of defendant's second visit to her
home (Tr. 7, 8) was not introduced to establish said offense;
and in fact did not establish it. Respondent submits that this
evidence was brought out by the prosecution only to show
preliminary facts with reference to the relationship of the
parties, to indicate the frame of mind of defendant and the
intention with which he committed the later assault. In
addition it will be observed that. during the second visit of
defendant to the home of prosecutrix he did not expose himself, he was not there alone with prosecutrix, the lights were
on, defendant did not attempt the sexual act. On the occasion
of the third visit, defendant assaulted prosecutrix in her bed
(Tr. 9, 10, 11, 12).

Respondent invites the court's attention to the case of
People vs. Miller, 56 Cal. App. 472, 206 P. 89, where a conviction of assault with intent to commit rape was sustained.
There the defendant took prosecutrix riding in an automobile,
turned off the main highway into a "little road," threw his
11
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arms around her and proposed sexual intercourse, she resisted,
and he discontinued his advances. This incident took place in
the afternoon. Later, after dark of the same day, at another
location, defendant again made an assault upon prosecutrix;
this time forcing her to touch his privates and demanding
she accede to his demands. Defendant, on appeal, contended
that the prosecution should have elected between the assault
of the afternoon and that of the evening. The court, in dis·
cussing the alleged error, at page 91, said:

* * * It is apparent from the record that evidence of
the occurrences during the afternoon was not offered
to prove the commission of the crime at that time, but
to show the relations between the parties and the conduct of the defendant as bearing upon the intent with
which he committed the later assault. The case is wholly
unlike that of People vs. Williams, 133 Cal. 165, 65
Pac. 323, relied upon by appellant, where many distinct crimes of rape were proved, covering a period of
four months * * *
The cases of State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 P. 215;
People v. Laycock, 66 Colo. 441, 182 P. 880; People v. Martinez, 57 Cal. App. 771, 208 P .170; are relied upon by appellant. The evidence in these cases showed several distinct
crimes of rape committed over a period of fourteen months;
two years, and three days, respectively. Respondent thinks these
cases are wholly unlike the case presently before thecourt.
Respondent respectfully submits that an examination of
the record in the instant case will disclose that the information
charged only one offense; further, that all of the evidence was
directed toward the proof of the one offense, viz., the assault
12
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with intent to commit rape committed on prosecutrix on the
occasion of defendant's third intrusion. Therefore, it is concluded defendant was not prejudiced in his defense, nor were
there grounds for a motion in arrest of judgment. 105-35-1,
Utah Code Ann., 1943.

CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully submits that a review of the
transcript and proceedings in this case reveals sufficient and
ample evidence upon which to sustain the conviction of appellant of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape. Themotion of appellant for arrest of judgment was properly denied,
and that appellant was not prejudiced in his defense.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN,
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent.
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